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THE MISUSE OF PRODUCT MISUSE: VICTIM
BLAMING AT ITS WORST
ROBERT S. ADLER*
ANDREW F. POPPER**
ABSTRACT
This Paper addresses the legal consequences that surface
when a consumer uses a product in a manner not specifically intended by that product’s designer or manufacturer. If a product is
used in a reasonably foreseeable manner, the fact that the use is
at odds with a manufacturer’s intention should not be a basis to
deny tort liability or limit the regulatory options of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission. If a product proves to be unsafe, defective, dangerous, or otherwise hazardous to users and consumers,
use patterns should not be the primary determinant in assessing
regulatory and common law sanctions or consequences. While producers may wish to limit tort liability or regulatory impact by
characterizing as wrongful all uses not fully consistent with specified instructions, limiting tort liability or regulatory impact is
indefensible, inhumane, and at odds with common law tort principles and the clear purposes of the Consumer Product Safety Act.
Penalizing consumers for uses that are reasonable but not expressly
intended is little more than victim blaming. A legal culture that
scapegoats consumers is justly seen as pathological regulatory capture. Ramped up consumer misuse standards reward those who
create risks and punish those who are harmed. That cannot possibly be the goal of the common law or the legacy anticipated when
the Consumer Product Safety Commission was formed nearly a
half-century ago.

Commissioner, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission.
Bronfman Professor of Law and Government, American University Washington College of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
The 50-50-90 rule: anytime you have a 50-50 chance of getting
something right, there’s a 90 [percent] probability you’ll get it
wrong.
ɆAndy Rooney, 60 Minutes1
Even monkeys fall from trees.
ɆChris Bradford, The Ring of Earth2

Everyone makes mistakes,3 which means that all of us, as
consumers, will undoubtedly be guilty of misusing products at some
time in our lives. Fortunately, most of our mistakes will result in
inconvenience and embarrassment rather than broken bones or
worse. However, there are times when a slight loss of attention,
a distraction, or a failure to heed warnings or follow instructions
can mean disaster.
No rational actor seeks injury—but there are times when
product misuse (mistakes in attentiveness, care, or judgment in
Andy Rooney Quotes, BRAINYQUOTE, https://www.brainyquote.com/quotes
/andy_rooney_194055 [https://perma.cc/WW9M-CS5Y].
2 CHRIS BRADFORD, YOUNG SAMURAI: THE RING OF EARTH 200 (2010).
3 There is a large body of literature on how and why we make mistakes, most
predicated on the fact that being hardwired as humans makes it inevitable that
we will err. See e.g., JOSEPH T. HALLINAN, WHY WE MAKE MISTAKES: HOW WE
LOOK WITHOUT SEEING, FORGET THINGS IN SECONDS, AND ARE ALL PRETTY
SURE WE ARE WAY ABOVE AVERAGE 2–3 (2009) (studying human error and
scientific reasons why it exists through real-life stories); Olga Khazan, Why
Mistakes Are Often Repeated, ATLANTIC (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.theatlan
tic.com/science/archive/2016/02/why-mistakes-are-often-repeated/470778/ [http://
perma.cc/Y28T-PM4D] (discussing neurological reasons why failure to learn from
past mistakes causes people to repeatedly make the same mistakes); Sophie
Morris, Oops, We Did it Again—Why We Make Mistakes, INDEPENDENT
(Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.independent.co.uk/artsentertainment/books/features
/oops-we-did-it-again-why-we-make-mistakes-1645571.html [http://perma.cc
/5A4C-SCFZ] (looking at ways to avoid the simple errors humans inevitably make
every day); Why Clever People Make More Mistakes Than Most, BBC CAPITAL
(Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/capital/story/20151119-why-clever-people
-make-more-stupid-mistakes-than-everyone-else [http://perma.cc/A58X-PPU4]
(distinguishing intelligence from rational thinking and reasoning that the most
successful people often make mistakes others do not because of certain personality
traits); Why Making Mistakes Is What Makes Us Human, KQED (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://ww2.kqed.org/mindshift/2015/09/02/making-mistakes-is-what-makes-us
-human/ [http://perma.cc/S4WJ-6TLR] (describing Kathryn Shultz’s TED Talk
on seeing the value in being wrong).
1
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the use of a product) results in the loss of life or limb.4 No one is
perfect. Stated another way, the one thing that is inevitable is that
we will err. Those who work in the field of product safety know this
and, accordingly, strive to articulate, implement, and enforce appropriate standards and measures to prevent tragedies that arise
from product misuse before those harms occur.5
Product misuse has commanded the attention of various
observers, commentators, and policymakers over the years.6 The
debate has revolved around the extent to which a health and safety
agency like the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
should regulate when consumers have been injured or killed using
products in ways not intended or sanctioned by manufacturers,
but in ways readily foreseeable.7
When consumers are injured through misuse of a product,
the regulatory approach and the common law model follow two different policy paths.8 In a product liability action, the conventional
approach for the last three decades has been to limit9 or deny10
See Robert Adler, Redesigning People Versus Redesigning Products: The
Consumer Product Safety Commission Addresses Product Misuse, 11 J.L. &
POL’Y 79, 79 (1995).
5 See id. at 80.
6 “Product misuse” has been defined in many different ways. At the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), it ranges from the involuntary or
unknowing departure from manufacturer’s instructions to deliberate risk taking
in contravention of known safety norms. The policy implications of product
misuse have been around as long as health and safety regulation has existed.
As long-time observers of CPSC, we have focused our comments on the issue at
CPSC. However, this discussion is applicable to other health and safety agencies
like FDA, OSHA, and EPA. It is a topic that Commissioner Adler first explored
almost a quarter century ago. See id. at 81. Sadly, from our perspective, it is an
issue that never goes away.
7 See id. at 81, 86.
8 See id. at 80.
9 See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001) (affirming lower court’s reduction of damages based on misuse of sauna equipment
making the user thirty-five percent negligent); see generally Randy Koenders,
Products Liability: Product Misuse Defense, 65 A.L.R. 4TH 263, 270–84 (1988)
(discussing misuse as a defense generally and how individual states approach
the product misuse defense).
10 A complete denial of recovery occurs in those states that apply contributory negligence to cases. A reduction of damages occurs where states apply
comparative negligence to cases. Most states today follow the latter approach.
See e.g., Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Garrett Cty. v. Bell Atl., 695 A.2d 171, 181 (Md.
4
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recovery if the cause of an injury is the unforeseeable misuse11 of
that product. A foreseeable, but unreasonable use, in contrast, does
not necessarily cut off liability: “Unforeseeable” and “unreasonable”
are not synonyms.12 “Therefore, unreasonable misuse is not a defense to a strict liability defective product claim.”13 Thus, an unreasonable use may well be a reasonably foreseeable misuse and
does not necessarily bar liability.14
The factors in play regarding the debate between unreasonable use and unforeseeable misuse are part of the tort reform
discourse.15 They involve the potential of significant money
damages and broader questions underlying strict liability in tort.16
They are more focused on remedy for an injured person than on
the broader public safety goals extant in the regulatory domain.17
Unlike the common law model, Congress and federal agencies have generally adopted a broader approach in the regulatory
1997); John Cowley & Bros., Inc. v. Brown, 569 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala. 1990); Smith
v. Fiber Controls Corp., 268 S.E.2d 504, 504 (N.C. 1980); Wingfield v. Peoples
Drug Store Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 687 (D.C. 1977); Basket v. Banks, 45 S.E.2d 173,
177 (Va. 1947); Comparative & Contributory Negligence, JUSTIA, https://www
.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/comparative-contributory-negligence/ [http://
perma.cc/7K6C-KDSX] (stating that Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia
and Washington, D.C. are the only jurisdictions that still apply pure contributory negligence, which bars a plaintiff from recovering if he or she acted negligently and contributed to the accident in any way); see also William L.
Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1953) (explaining the
origin of the comparative negligence doctrine).
11 In this Paper, we distinguish between unforeseeable misuse of a product, a
common bar to tort liability, and unreasonable uses that reflect a lack of due care
but are foreseeable that are not necessarily a bar, e.g., using a power lawn mower
to trim tall weeds or low-lying brush, are not intended uses from a manufacturer’s
perspective, but are foreseeable. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW
890–91 (2d ed. 2008); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. at p
(AM. LAW INST. 1998) (endorsing the “unforeseeable misuse” standard).
12 See Cigna Ins. Co., 241 F.3d at 16–18.
13 See Calmes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 61 Ohio St.3d 470, 476 (1991).
14 Asay v. Kolberg-Pioneer, No. 2:08-CV-01242-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 32390006
(D. Nev. Aug. 13, 2010) (stating that “[a] plaintiff’s misuse of a product, which is
not reasonably foreseeable, is ... a defense to strict products liability,” and citing
Crown Controls Corp. v. Corella, 98 Nev. 35, 37 (1982) (per curiam) which goes
on to hold that “use of a product that the manufacturer should reasonably anticipate is not misuse or abuse.”).
15 See ANDREW F. POPPER, MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM 16 (2d ed. 2017).
16 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A ch. 14 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
17 See id.
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product safety context.18 Here, the legislature has directed agencies
like CPSC to protect even careless consumers from dangerous
products so long as the protective measures do not unduly raise
the price or affect the utility of a product.19 This is made clear in
the Consumer Product Safety Act where the agency is directed
to make specific findings about the impact of a rule on a product’s
utility, cost, or availability, but is fully authorized to act in instances where consumer misuse is likely or present.20 The theory
is that dangerous products that can be rendered safe at minimal
cost should be made so even when consumers do not act as manufacturers intend.21 As a humane society, we want to reduce unnecessary pain and suffering especially when the cost of doing so
is reasonable. Moreover, despite the temptation to invoke moral
judgments about product misuse (“they deserve what they got”)
or to insist that harsh treatment of those who blunder will convince consumers to take greater care (“teach them a lesson they
won’t soon forget”), a significant body of research demonstrates that
“most accidents are truly accidents, not the result of gambles
that turn out badly.”22 What is termed “misuse” by producers
See Adler, supra note 4, at 80.
Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051–89 (2012); see Guide 51:
Safety aspects—Guidelines for their inclusion in standards, INT’L ORG. STANDARDIZATION & INT’L ELECTROTECHNICAL COMM’N i, v (Jan. 3, 2014) [hereinafter
ISO Safety Guidelines] (making recommendations for how to draft safety standards in compliance with international requirements and standards).
20 § 2058(f)(1) (“Prior to promulgating a consumer product safety rule, the
Commission shall consider, and make appropriate findings for inclusion for such
rule with respect to ... the need of the public for the consumer products subject to
such rule, and the probable effect of such rule upon the utility, cost, or availability of such products to meet such need.”).
21 While the primary focus of this Paper is on the CPSC and the regulatory
environment, the question posed regarding the baseline standard for assessing the
use of a product by a consumer (intended use vs. reasonably foreseeable use)
is also one of the core issues in the tort reform discourse as it pertains to tort
liability in the civil justice system. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS.
LIAB. § 2 cmt. m (AM. LAW. INST. 1998) (attempting to limit liability to intended
uses rather than reasonably foreseeable uses); ANDREW F. POPPER, MATERIALS ON
TORT REFORM 16 (2d ed. 2017) (identifying this topic as a tort reform issue);
Martin A. Kotler, The Myth of Individualism and the Appeal of Tort Reform,
59 RUTGERS L. REV. 779, 823 (2007) (mentioning the misuse vs. reasonably
foreseeable use debate).
22 Howard Latin, Good Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1200 (1994). According to Professor Latin’s research,
18
19
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often turns out not to be blatant risk-taking or mindless carelessness, but instead is predictable and utterly human behavior
such as forgetfulness, lack of knowledge, momentary losses of
concentration, impulsiveness, or unforeseen distractions.23
Quite simply, while the doctrine of unforeseeable misuse
can play a definitive role in certain product liability cases, it is of
little or no consequence in the regulatory context where the primary
focus must be on the product itself and not on the misuse of the
product by a consumer.24 This in no way diminishes the complementary role tort law plays in the quest for safer products.
Tort liability can and does achieve the dual goals of personal remedy and deterrence, sending a powerful and cautionary
message to producers of the same or similar products.25 For
product users, as opposed to producers, tort law embodies a very
different type of deterrence by limiting civil liability in those
instances where a consumer’s misuse of a product is “so highly
extraordinary as to be unforeseeable ....”26 In such cases, unforeseeable misuse can be considered a “superseding cause” and limits
or cuts off the defendant’s liability.27
The Mississippi Supreme Court noted recently: “[I]f the end
user could always recover damages from a manufacturer, regardless
of the misuse of the product, customers, beyond concerns of selfpreservation ... would have little incentive to ensure they used the
product properly.”28 The tort doctrine of unforeseeable misuse,
“promotes the social goal of both manufacturers and customers
“[m]ost accidents are truly accidents, not the result of deliberate gambles that
turn out badly.” Id. A court may assume that serious injury due to failure to
read warnings was due to “unusually careless or deliberately risky behavior,”
but in reality, there are avoidable and reasonable explanations for why warnings—even good warnings—are not being read. Id. at 1207.
23 See Michael S. Wogalter et al., Risk Perception of Common Consumer Products: Judgments of Accident Frequency and Precautionary Intent, 24 J. SAFETY
RES. 97, 100 (1993) (reporting that individuals overestimate low-probability
product risks and underestimate high-probability product risks).
24 Adler, supra note 4, at 115.
25 Andrew F. Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 75 ALB. L. REV. 181, 191 (2012).
26 Perez v. VAS S.p.A., 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 590, 607 (Ct. App. 2010); see Mine
Safety Appliance Co. v. Holmes, 171 So. 3d 442, 454 (Miss. 2015).
27 Mine Safety Appliance Co., 171 So. 3d at 454; Perez, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
607–08.
28 Mine Safety Appliance Co., 171 So. 3d at 454.
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exercising due care.”29 However, that unforeseeable misuse of a
product can limit or bar tort liability in the civil justice system is
entirely separate from the regulatory goals of product safety at
the CPSC.30
Merely because a consumer misuses a product and by doing so is unable to succeed in a cause of action in tort is often
unrelated to the question of whether a product is unsafe.31 Consider that this limitation on recovery is in play when the consumer’s
“unforeseeable misuse of the product substantially change[s] the
condition of the product, and that change, and not the alleged
defect, is the proximate cause of the alleged injury ....”32
From a broader perspective: the safety of consumer goods
is an inarguable public interest. If a product is unsafe because of
its design, manufacture, or lack of an appropriate warning, the way
in which one person used—or misused—or unforeseeably misused—
the product is rarely relevant. It is the product itself, not the coincidental misuse that must be the focus of agency action. We strongly
disagree with those who would bar a health and safety agency
like CPSC from protecting consumers where misuse has played
a part in a product’s risk. Our reason is clear: Were CPSC and
other agencies limited to instances in which injuries, illness, or
death occurred only during the “proper” or “intended” use of a
product, many of the agency’s rules and regulations would be
rendered invalid, exposing consumers to great danger from hazardous products.33
For example, most ingestions of poisons and toxic chemicals that the Poison Prevention Packaging Act34 guards against
occur because caregivers inappropriately leave such products free
Id.
See id.
31 See id.
32 Id.
33 See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 1120.3(b)(1) (2015) (categorizing children’s upper outerwear with one or more drawstrings as “substantial product hazards”); 16 C.F.R.
§ 1511.7 (1977) (“[P]acifiers shall be labelled with the statement: “Warning—
Do Not Tie Pacifier Around Child’s Neck as it Presents a Strangulation Danger.”);
16 C.F.R. § 1500.83(a)(38)(iv) (2010) (requiring writing instruments containing
more than three grams of ink to be labeled as “toxic.”).
34 Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1471–75, § 1471
(2012).
29
30
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for children to access.35 Similarly, the ghastly fire injuries and
fatalities from flammable fabrics that have triggered CPSC safety
rules typically result from careless smokers or from unsupervised children playing with matches or lighters.36 Furthermore,
CPSC can and does take action to address injuries from products
like lawn mowers that result from consumers’ risky—but completely predictable—actions, such as putting their hands under
the housing of a mower to clear debris.37
In these and similar instances, the Commission has traditionally adopted Congress’s basic notion that it is far easier to
redesign hazardous products than to reconfigure careless consumers. Of course, as with any broad policy, there are limits. Where
consumer misbehavior is highly reckless and constitutes unforeseeable misuse, the kinds of precautions that companies should
have to take to safeguard consumers would generally be beyond
the duty of care to which a manufacturer should be held.38
One final point: equally unpersuasive is the notion that protecting careless consumers is generally futile because people will
35 See Eileen M. McDonald et al., Primary Care Opportunities to Prevent
Unintentional Home Injuries: A Focus on Children and Older Adults, 12 AM.
J. LIFESTYLE MED. 96, 97 (2018) (urging primary care doctors to play a more
central role in patient safety to prevent unintentional home injuries).
36 See 16 C.F.R. § 1602.1(a)–(e) (2012) (Flammable Fabrics Act); see also
Upholstered Furniture, Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 59 Fed.
Reg. 114, 30735 (June 15, 1994) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1640) (proposing a
flammability standard for furniture fabrics associated with fires due to small
open flames, such as cigarettes).
37 See 16 C.F.R. § 1205.5(a) (implementing blade control systems and a blade
stopping test for walk-behind power mowers); Lawn Mower Safety, U. S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N (June 4, 1987), https://www.cpsc.gov/content
/lawn-mower-safety [http://perma.cc/ZG5D-GSUM] (discussing how new safety
features on mowers will reduce accidents like injury from contact with the blade).
38 A good illustration of the distinction made can be found in a recent article, Lindsey Bever, Teens are daring each other to eat Tide Pods. We don’t need to
tell you that’s a bad idea, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/01/13/teens-are-daring-each-other-to
-eat-tide-pods-we-dont-need-to-tell-you-thats-a-bad-idea/?noredirect=on&utm
_term=.7397b6834d72 [http://perma.cc/C964-53FG]. According to the article,
a number of teenagers on social media have developed a fad of intentionally
biting into brightly colored, highly toxic liquid laundry packets. In contrast,
thousands of children under age five have innocently bitten into the packets
believing them to be candy. Id. The latter group is the one that most deserves
societal protection.
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simply take more risks when products are made safer.39 The idea
that people will blindly take calculated or even unreasonable
chances—and that tendency explains the harms that befall them—
is victim blaming.40
I. A BRIEF SNAPSHOT OF VICTIM BLAMING
It is neither within our professional expertise nor our primary purpose to delve deeply into the psychology of victim blaming.
Defenses in civil actions or explanations of seeming product failures predicated on consumer use, reasonably foreseeable misuse,
and use that is at odds with the producer’s intentions, focus on
and blame consumers for the harm they sustained.41 Contributory negligence and comparative fault (victim blaming doctrines)
are central to understanding tort law and are predicated on the
assumption that the actions (or inactions) of product users must
be a central part of assessing civil liability.42
There are many explanations for victim blaming. We will
mention just two: (1) the hope of avoiding tort liability or regulatory
This school of thought, often called Risk Compensation Theory (“RCT”) (or,
sometimes, “moral hazard”), posits that safety measures are almost always offset
by consumers taking more risks and, therefore, are useless and counterproductive. Although occasionally persuasive, RCT has been increasingly debunked
as more evidence accumulates that safety measures have resulted in a “marked
decline in injury deaths in most of the world over the last 50 years.” Barry Pless,
Risk Compensation: Revisited and Rebutted, 2 SAFETY 1, 6 (2016).
40 See id.
41 See Cigna Ins. Co. v. Oy Saunatec, Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 2001).
42 See Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 791, 806 (1990)
(discussing victim blaming and other perils of tort law); Michael D. Green, The
Unanticipated Ripples of Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products
Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1103, 1104–05 (2002); Frank L. Maraist
et al., Answering a Fool According to His Folly: Ruminations on Comparative
Fault Thirty Years On, 70 LA. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2010) (overview of comparative fault and “foolhardy” plaintiffs); William L. Prosser, Comparative Negligence,
41 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15 (1953) (on the jurisprudence of comparative fault and
the challenge of addressing alleged misconduct of victims); David W. Robertson, Love and Fury: Recent Radical Revisions to the Law of Comparative Fault, 59
LA. L. REV. 175, 188 (1998) (advocating the use of comparative fault and not
contributory negligence); Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Two Wrongs
Do Not Make a Right: Reconsidering the Application of Comparative Fault to
Punitive Damage Awards, 78 MO. L. REV. 133, 134–35 (2013) (nuanced discussion of comparative fault and punitive damages).
39
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sanction, and (2) the heartfelt need to trust the safety of the world
around us.43 In assessing this aspect of our regulatory and civil justice systems, we have no difficulty assessing the liability avoidance
rationale.44 The second rationale requires a brief explanation.
It is our observation that after learning of an unexpected
and horrifying incident or accident, there seems to be an impulse
(or even unstated hope) that somehow, the victim is at fault.45
This may well emanate from an understandable need to distance
oneself from hazard.46
We think it self-evident that the closer we get to catastrophe, the more relatable and frightening catastrophe becomes. We
neither sought verification nor believe it necessary to borrow from
other disciplines to support this observation. However, we did test
the premise (admittedly unscientifically).47 For this exercise, we
invented and then told our “subjects” (law students, law school
administrators, and law faculty) two stories. Both stories started as
follows: “Did you see that piece in the paper this morning about ...?”
The first story finished the sentence by describing a particularly violent crime and waiting to see the response. Over and
over, we heard sympathy for the victim and a question about where
the crime took place. Different answers regarding location produced
different results—but consistently, when we said the crime occurred in some far-flung part of the city, the discussion would end
within a minute or two. Once distanced from the threat, the incident became less frightening.
The second story finished the sentence by describing a severe and deadly product failure (we used both consumer goods and
pharmaceuticals). Again, after sympathy, we heard a different type
of distancing. It came in the form of a suggestion from our subjects
See Popper, supra note 25, at 186, 190.
See generally POPPER, supra note 15 (exploring the arguments of those who
seek to limit or change civil liability and those who oppose those limitations).
45 Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice
and the Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1393 (2003) (explanations of unexpected harm are not always premised on fact: “We blame
the fight on the bully, the accident on the klutz.”)
46 See Popper, supra note 25, at 201.
47 We apologize to those social scientists and empiricists who find our methods
unconvincing and primitive. We accept your criticism. We also believe that this
insight is beyond question.
43
44
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that something so unexpected may well have been the result of
the user/victim not paying attention, not reading instructions, i.e.,
that the victim facilitated, invited, and was responsible for the
catastrophe.48 Distancing and victim blaming49 are benign fantasies50 that support the hope that we live in a world where harm
befalls those who fail to exercise due care, fail to protect themselves in ways that we, the “careful” people, would not let happen.51
We do not put these thoughts forward as an excuse for the general tendency to blame victims—but rather as an explanation of
one force driving victim blaming at a personal level. After all, who
wants to think we live in a world where the most innocent among
us, for no reason whatsoever, can suddenly fall victim to something
so terrifying and inexplicable?52 This may explain why our civil
Michael L. Rustad, Heart of Stone: What is Revealed About the Attitude
of Compassionate Conservatives Towards Nursing Home Practices, Tort Reform,
and Noneconomic Damages, 35 N.M. L. REV. 337, 360 (2005) (“Few themes resonate more with the American public than ‘blaming the victim.’”).
49 Victim blaming is nothing particularly new. Mary J. Davis, Individual and
Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 318 (1994) (tracing victim blaming back to ancient
Rome: “Just as twentieth century defendants seek to blame the victim, the
Romans commonly looked to the plaintiff’s conduct (or the conduct of the plaintiff’s
slave) as a means of avoiding liability.” [footnote omitted]).
50 That illusion can be shattered when something awful happens to a loved
one who, in fact, was paying attention, attentive, doing everything “right”—and
yet, is a victim. While it may seem odd in an article of this nature, we share
with you the following vignette. On January 11, 1982, Professor Popper’s oldest
son, then just under the age of four, was in a supermarket with his mother when,
without warning, a vending machine fell on him and nearly killed him. It was
a freak accident—terrifying at every level. After extensive analysis, it turned out
that the actual cause of the accident was faulty design of the machine—but for
months—and even still today—whenever that unthinkable and life-changing
event came up, people first asked, “What was he doing? Maybe he was pulling
on the machine? Climbing on it?”
51 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Essay: A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine
Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1767–68 (2014) (“We prefer to believe that things
happen for a reason, and thus that victims of harms deserve their fate ... .
[This] may help explain how jurors determine causation in torts cases.” [footnote omitted]).
52 Incidents of sexual assault can bring out one of the most disturbing and
infuriating sides of this response set—blaming the victim of the assault. Dripps,
supra note 45, at 1389 (“In rape cases, the jury may be encouraged to blame
the victim for sexual activity. This may very well translate into an irrational
48
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justice system—tort law generally and particularly product liability law—tilts in favor of victim blaming.53
To be clear, our premise is not that people who are harmed
are universally and uniformly faultless. There are instances where
people misuse products or use products in ways that are not just
unforeseeable but are at odds with common sense, times when
people assume risks and contribute to their own harm(s).54 Our
premise, however, is that such incidents are not the norm. Our
concern is that ramped up regulatory standards for product misuse
envision a world of reckless actors, a world at odds with reality.55
Victim blaming on an institutional level, however, has an
entirely different rationale. Institutional or corporate victim blaming is a very profitable strategy.56 When successful, victim blaming capitalizes on the aforementioned human tendencies and allows
those who cause harm to avoid the cost of accountability.57 However, in the regulatory domain, where compensatory and punitive
damages are not in play and the only real question is the safety
of the products that surround us, the same constructs regarding
victim blaming should not be relevant. Whether the user of a
product exercised optimal care, ordinary care, or less than optimal care should not bar effective remedial actions.
How someone may have used, misused, or unreasonably
misused a product in the past should play little role in determining whether that product is sufficiently dangerous to merit CPSC
inference of consent from the victim’s character.”); Kristen M. Klein et al., Attributions of Blame and Responsibility in Sexual Harassment: Reexamining a Psychological Model, 35 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 92, 94 (2011).
53 David G. Owen, Products Liability: User Misconduct Defenses, 52 S.C. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2000) (regarding consumer responsibility for harm: “When a person
is injured while using a product, the accident may be attributable to some defect
in the product. But even if a product is defective in some respect, most product
accidents are caused more by the consumer’s risky behavior in using the product
than by the product’s defective condition.”).
54 Barring a plaintiff who contributes to his or her harm has been part of the
tort law discourse for centuries. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.
1809) (holding one who causes harm to themselves cannot recover in tort).
55 See, e.g., infra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
56 Rustad, supra note 48, at 360 (“‘Victim’s talk’ in the tort arena is used ...
to disavow responsibility for defective products, bad medicine, and unsafe
practices ....”).
57 Id.
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action.58 At CPSC, the focus should be on the safety and utility of
the product, taking into account all reasonably foreseeable uses—
and nothing more.
II. REASONABLY FORESEEABLE MISUSE AND CPSC’S
STATUTORY MANDATES
CPSC enforces a number of acts in addition to the Consumer
Product Safety Act, including the Federal Hazardous Substances
Act,59 the Flammable Fabrics Act,60 the Poison Prevention Packaging Act,61 and the Refrigerator Safety Act.62 Although these acts
use somewhat different language in defining their scope, we believe it to be beyond question that all provide the authority and
responsibility for these agencies to act in instances of reasonably
foreseeable product misuse.63 Here is a brief summary:
Consumer Product Safety Act: In 1968, Congress established
a study commission, the National Commission on Product Safety
(NCPS), to determine whether the nation’s consumer product safety
protections were sufficient to safeguard the public from unreasonable risks of injury.64 NCPS found that an independent safety
agency dedicated to addressing consumer products was essential.65
Congress largely followed NCPS’s blueprint for such an agency two
years later when it enacted the Consumer Product Safety Act.66
Without question, the NCPS called for the new agency to
have the authority to act in cases of product misuse so long as
Adler, supra note 4, at 85.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1261–78 (2012).
60 Id. §§ 1191–1204.
61 Id. §§ 1471–77.
62 Id. §§ 1211–14.
63 See ISO Safety Guidelines, supra note 19, at 2 (defining “reasonably foreseeable misuse” as “use of a product or system in a way not intended by the supplier, but which can result from readily predictable human behaviour”). The
Guidelines further provide that “[r]eadily predictable human behaviour” is meant
to include all users including “the elderly, children and persons with disabilities.”
See also infra notes 135–40.
64 See S.J. Res. 33, Joint resolution to establish a National Commission on
Product Safety, Pub. L. No. 90-146, 81 Stat. 466–67 (1967).
65 See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT 5 (1970)
[hereinafter NCPS].
66 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2053–54 (2012).
58
59
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manufacturers could reasonably have foreseen such misuse: “the
manufacturer or seller ought not be absolved merely because the
consumer used the product in a manner different from that intended. A manufacturer should be responsible for injury to consumers from use or certain types of misuse which could reasonably
have been anticipated.”67
Consistent with this theme, Congress made clear its intention that the agency be authorized to act in instances of reasonably
foreseeable product misuse.68 As Senator Frank Moss, one of the
key architects of the CPSA, stated:
It is ... my hope that [the courts] will take notice of the fact that
the word “associated” was chosen so as to convey the fact that the
risk of injury did not have to result from “normal use” of the consumer product but could also result from such things as “exposure
to or reasonable foreseeable misuse of the consumer product.”69

We note that the Senate version of the Act included a definition of the term “use,” which explicitly included a reference to
“reasonably foreseeable misuse.”70 The House-Senate Conference
Committee that met to work out the differences between the two
bodies, however, adopted the House version of the Act, which did
not contain this language.71
NCPS, supra note 65, at 75. The Report further stated, “[m]anufacturers
must take all practical steps systematically to prevent foreseeable misuse of
products.” Id. at 62. See generally BRUCE K. MULOCK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE, CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION: CPSIA IMPLEMENTATION
(2009), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RS22821.html [http://perma.cc
/9JTV-JZQ4].
68 The definition of the word “use” in the Senate Report accompanying the
CPSA confirms this proposition: “The definition of ‘use’ includes exposure to and
any normal use. In addition, it includes reasonably foreseeable misuse. The ambit
of risk, then, extends beyond exposure and normal use to those risks presented
by consumer products being misused if such misuse is ‘reasonably foreseeable.’”
S. REP. NO. 92-749, at 15 (1972).
69 118 CONG. REC. 36197, 36198 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1972) (statement of Sen.
Moss).
70 S. REP. NO. 92-749, at 15 (1972).
71 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1593 (1972). Although the House bill did not specifically define “unreasonable hazard” (which was selected to serve as the term
analogous to the Senate’s “unreasonable risk”), it did define “hazard” as “substantial risk of injury.” Id. at 16–17.
67
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One might ask whether this means that Congress rejected
the Senate’s version that consumer misuse be included in the
agency’s authority. The answer is clearly, no. Such an interpretation would misread the dynamic between the two houses in working out their statutory differences. What actually happened was
that the Senate broadly conceded to the House on most provisions
of the Act because the Senate would have placed regulatory authority over almost all consumer products in the new agency: a
proposition to which the House strongly objected.72 No profound—
or even minor—disagreement over the role of consumer misuse
was ever raised or discussed between the two bodies.73
Moreover, if Congress had wished to exclude consumer
misuse from CPSC jurisdiction, one wonders why it did not do so
in a much more explicit fashion given how expansive the legislature had been in extending the scope of the other acts enforced
by the agency to include product misuse.74
Finally, if there were any lingering doubts about the authority of the agency to protect consumers injured through reasonably foreseeable product misuse, they were put to rest in
Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Commission.75 In
that case, a lawn mower manufacturer argued that CPSC could
not regulate its product because consumers assumed the risk of
injury.76 The U.S. Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that neither consumer misuse nor assumption of risk limited
CPSC’s regulatory authority:
Congress intended for injuries resulting from foreseeable misuse
of a product to be counted in assessing risk ... . This principle,
and not the tort liability concept of “assumption of risk,” governs
See BUREAU OF NAT’L AFFAIRS, THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT:
TEXT, ANALYSIS, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 32 (1973) (“It is general practice with
congressional conferences for each side to give up something in order to gain
approval of something else, but with the consumer product safety bill, the Senate
came out with very little of its bill intact. The major hurdle for House acceptance
was the Senate’s inclusion of broad regulatory authority over almost all consumer products, including food, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and veterinary medicine.”).
73 Id.
74 See supra notes 15–38 and accompanying text.
75 Southland Mower Co. v. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n, 619 F.2d 499,
499 (5th Cir. 1980).
76 Id. at 503–04, 513 (challenging the regulation for going beyond its scope
by including “nonconsumer products”).
72
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the Commission’s authority to treat consumers’ foreseeable
action of removing safety shields as creating an unreasonable
risk of injury and to issue rules addressing that danger. 77

Federal Hazardous Substances Act (FHSA): The language
and legislative history of the FHSA similarly make clear that
Congress intended the Act to extend to instances of foreseeable
misuse.78 Specifically, in section 2(f)(1)(A), Congress defined a
“hazardous substance” as including “injuries ... or ... illness during or as a proximate result of any customary or reasonably foreseeable handling or use, including reasonably foreseeable ingestion
by children.”79
Even more telling: In 1966, Congress modified the FHSA
to expand it from a purely labeling act to one that authorized
standards and bans.80 In the 1969 amendments, Congress expanded the definition of “hazardous substance” to include “toy[s]
and other article[s] intended for use by children” if they present
a mechanical, electrical, or thermal hazard.81 In doing so, Congress
explicitly included reasonably foreseeable misuse as part of the
Act’s jurisdiction.82 Consistent with the Act’s direction, the Commission has long maintained a set of test methods for simulating
use and abuse of toys and other articles intended for children to
determine whether they present electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazards.83
Id. at 513.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(1)(A) (2012).
79 Id.
80 Technically, the 1966 amendments authorized only bans, but the distinction
between standards and bans is semantic only, since most standards effectively
ban non-complying products and most bans prohibit only a subset of regulated
products.
81 Pub. L. No. 91-113, 83 Stat. 187, 187 (1969) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1261–74 (2012)).
82 15 U.S.C. § 1261(r)–(t). As stated in the Senate Report: “Common to
each of the definitions [of electrical, mechanical, and thermal hazards] is the
phrase, ‘in normal use or when subjected to reasonably foreseeable damage or
abuse.’ The phrase places a significant duty upon the manufacturer of any toy
or article intended for use by children. Not only must he consider the safety of
the product in normal use, he must also consider the safety of the article after
damage or abuse—after predicting what the child using the toy will reasonably do to it or with it.” S. REP. NO. 237, at 6 (1969).
83 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500.50–1500.53 (1975). Once a toy or article intended for use
by children is subjected to the appropriate use and abuse test, the Commission
77
78
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Flammable Fabrics Act, Poison Prevention Packaging Act,
and Refrigerator Safety Act: Briefly stated, the Flammable Fabrics
Act authorizes the CPSC to establish flammability standards for
furniture, sleepwear, general wearing apparel, and related materials “to protect the public against [the] unreasonable risk of
the occurrence of fire leading to death or personal injury, or significant property damage.”84
“The Poison Prevention Packaging Act ... directs the CPSC
to mandate ‘special packaging’ to protect children who might
handle or ingest dangerous household substances.”85 Typically,
this means that the agency requires child resistant closures on
products at a cost of pennies per container.86
Finally, the Refrigerator Safety Act requires that refrigerator doors be easily opened from within to prevent child suffocations.87 This Act has proven to be one of the most successful
pieces of safety regulation ever enacted virtually eliminating
childhood fatalities while almost certainly reducing the cost of
making refrigerators.88
What is common among these statutes is that they are all
strict liability laws, i.e., their requirements apply irrespective of
will then examine it to see whether it presents an electrical, mechanical, or thermal hazard, and thus constitutes a banned hazardous toy. See id. § 1500.18 (listing
banned toys determined to present mechanical, electrical, or thermal hazards).
84 15 U.S.C. § 1193(a).
85 Adler, supra note 4, at 90.
86 Requiring child-resistant packaging on over thirty household items has
significantly decreased the number of child fatalities per year. Stefan Hellbardt et
al., Packaging: Child-Resistant Features for Container Closure Systems, 18 DRUG
DEV. & DELIVERY 57, 58 (2018), http://drug-dev.com/packaging-child-resistant
-features-for-container-closure-systems/ [https://perma.cc/S82G-N9FA]; see K.A.
Mack et al., Preventing Unintentional Injuries in the Home Using the Health
Impact Pyramid, 42(IS) HEALTH ED. & BEHAV. 115S, 119S (2015) (noting that
“[s]tudies show clear declines in poisonings after the passing of the Poison
Prevention Packaging Act (PPPA) in 1970” due to the Act requiring various
household substances be securely packaged in child-resistant packaging) (further adding that data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) showed that only forty-two fatal unintentional poisonings were reported
for children aged 0 to 4 years in 2012); see also Angie Qin, Consumer Product
Safety Commission, Pediatric Poisoning Fatalities from 1972 Through 2013,
U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMMISSION 3 (2016), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs
-public/PPPAMortality2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ZST-BVXB].
87 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211–14 (2012).
88 Adler, supra note 4, at 90.
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proper or improper consumer use.89 In other words, a product
must comply with CPSC safety rules despite consumer misuse if
it is to be sold to the public.90 In this regard, the regulatory and
common law mandates regarding safety are indistinguishable.91
If a consumer is injured or killed because of the product’s failure
to comply with a CPSC rule, the manufacturer may be held liable in tort notwithstanding the consumer’s carelessness.92
III. WHETHER PRODUCT MISUSE IS TREATED DIFFERENTLY IN
PRODUCT RECALLS THAN IN SAFETY STANDARDS
Health and safety agencies encounter product misuse both
in recalling products and in crafting safety standards.93 One might
ask whether the two contexts call for different approaches, but
such a notion finds no support either in law or in public policy.94
See generally Coulter Boeschen, Strict Product Liability Laws, ALLLAW,
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/personal-injury/strict-product-liability-laws
.html [https://perma.cc/P5XB-UNZQ] (explaining that unlike proving fault in
an ordinary injury case, “strict liability rules—like the one applied to strict products liability cases—does away with the analysis of whether the defendant’s
conduct met a certain standard.”).
90 See id.
91 In most jurisdictions, a failure to comply with a safety rule is considered
per se negligence if a consumer is injured as a result of the manufacturer’s
noncompliance. See, e.g., Kaltman v. All Am. Pest Control, 706 S.E.2d 864, 866
(Va. Ct. App. 2011) (opining on whether the defendant’s use of a pesticide not
approved for residential use on plaintiff’s home constituted negligence per se);
Supreme Beef Packers, Inc., v. Maddox, 67 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. Ct. App.
2002) (alleging negligence per se for violations of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act); Nettleton v. Thompson, 787 P.2d 294, 294 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990)
(vacating and remanding case alleging negligence per se for a fall on an unsafe
stairway in violation of building code standards); see also Negligence Per Se,
JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/injury/negligence-theory/negligence-per-se/
[https://perma.cc/R3UB-WJCX].
92 See, e.g., Nettleton, 787 P.2d at 294.
93 See infra notes 108–14 and accompanying text.
94 To be clear, we do not claim that the test for declaring a product to be a
substantial product hazard is the same as finding that a product presents an
unreasonable risk for purposes of promulgating a safety standard. In the former
case, the Commission seeks to remove an otherwise legal product from the
marketplace due to its particularly hazardous nature whereas a safety standard never touches products currently in inventory or in distribution. A “substantial product hazard” determination focuses almost exclusively on the risk
89
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To explain this point, we start with the obligation of firms
under the Consumer Product Safety Act to report potentially dangerous products to CPSC.95 One might hypothesize—unpersuasively to us—that consumer misuse should not trigger a reporting
obligation under the Commission’s Substantial Product Hazard
Reporting Rule because no defect would be present.96 The only
time a firm would be obligated to report a potentially defective
product to CPSC would be when a serious hazard arose from the
“expected” or “proper” use of a product, i.e., when a consumer used
a product in a manner recommended or approved by the manufacturer.97 In this interpretation, even if a consumer used a product
in a reasonably foreseeable manner, no reporting obligation would
arise if the consumer did not follow the warnings and instructions for the product (i.e., the producer’s intention) or that the
consumer otherwise “misused” the product.98 And, if a firm need
not report a potential safety problem about a product to the
agency, a fortiori, the firm would not need to recall it.99
Aside from the fact that this interpretation of the agency’s
Substantial Product Hazard Reporting Rule would leave many
serious hazards undiscovered and unaddressed, it finds no support in the words of the rule.100 We believe that it stems from a
tortured reading of the reporting rule that goes back to 2006,
when the Commission amended the rule to add several factors
for firms to consider when deciding whether to report potentially
of a product for which a recall is sought and imposes a higher standard of proof
than that for setting a safety standard. These differences, however, are irrelevant
when it comes to determining whether the CPSC has different authority for
recalls than for standards in instances of consumer misuse.
95 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12 (2018). Under the Consumer Product Safety Act, firms
that distribute products and determine that one of their products contains a
defect which could create a substantial product hazard must immediately inform
CPSC of this determination. See 15 USC § 2064(b)(3) (2012).
96 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(a) (obligating the reporting of noncompliance, a
defect, or an unreasonable risk of serious injury or death).
97 See id. § 1115.12(b) (noting that a “[f]irm must report information indicating that a consumer product which it has distributed in commerce does not
comply with an applicable consumer product safety standard or ban issued
under the CPSA.”).
98 Id. § 1115.12(c).
99 See 15 U.S.C. § 2064.
100 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12.
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hazardous products to CPSC.101 The additional factors in the
amendment: obviousness of the risk; the adequacy of warnings
and instructions to mitigate such risk; the role of consumer misuse of the product and the foreseeability of such misuse.102
When the amendment to the reporting rule was added,
several consumer groups objected on the grounds that it might
be interpreted as limiting the scope of reports that needed to be
submitted to the agency.103 Not being privy to the thinking of the
members of the Commission at that time, we pass no judgment on
any subjective or unspoken motives that led to the amendment.
What we can judge, however, is CPSC’s stated rationale as set
forth in the Federal Register at the time of publication.104 There
is no hint of an intent to narrow the scope of the reporting rule.
To the contrary, the Commission stated: “These revisions are not
intended to reduce the number of reports to the Office of Compliance, to reduce or change the types of information reported, or
to suggest a diminished need to report.”105
Later, the Commission made the same point by arguing
that the added words merely clarified how the Commission had
been interpreting its rule for many years: “The Commission staff
already considers the proposed factors in making decisions about
potential defects .... Thus, the regulation only makes explicit what
was already implicit in the Commission’s regulation.”106
Accordingly, the most that can be said about this added
language is that it made no substantive change whatsoever in the
reporting rule. It merely put in writing that which had been the
practice for many years and has been and continues to be the
agency’s practice: to require firms to report where a hazard arises
from foreseeable consumer misuse.107 Moreover, a plain reading
See Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 71 Fed. Reg. 42028, 42029
(July 25, 2006) (codified at 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (2018)).
102 Id. (noting that the Commission and staff may consider some or all of
the factors set forth in paragraph (f)(1) in reaching the substantial product
hazard determination).
103 Id. at 42029. Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Kids in
Danger, and U.S. PIRG (Public Interest Research Group) raised this concern.
104 See id.
105 Id. at 42029.
106 Id. at 42030.
107 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g)(1)(iii) (2018) (the Commission “[w]ill consider
the ... reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population
101
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of the text of the reporting rule leads to a similar conclusion. As
amended, section 1115.4 now reads in part:
In determining whether the risk of injury associated with a
product is the type of risk which will render the product defective, the Commission and staff will consider, as appropriate: The
utility of the product involved; the nature of the risk of injury
which the product presents; the necessity for the product; the
population exposed to the product and its risk of injury; the
obviousness of such risk; the adequacy of warnings and instructions to mitigate such risk; the role of consumer misuse of the
product and the foreseeability of such misuse; the Commission’s own experience and expertise; the case law interpreting
Federal and State public health and safety statutes; the case
law in the area of products liability; and other factors relevant
to the determination.108

The import of this language is obvious. When deciding
whether a company should report a potentially dangerous product,
the Commission will look at virtually every aspect of the product’s risk to determine whether there is a defect, i.e., “a fault,
flaw, or irregularity that causes weakness, failure, or inadequacy
in form or function.”109 If anything, the words constitute a checklist
for firms deciding whether to report.110 They serve as reminders,
not limiters.111
Finally, keeping in mind that the Substantial Product Hazard Reporting Rule is an interpretive rule promulgated by CPSC
to provide guidance to the public,112 one wonders why the agency
would limit the instances in which firms otherwise obligated to
report should not do so. The illogic of such an approach lends credence to the notion that the agency’s very broad reporting rule
group exposed to the product” when determining if the risk to the consumer
is substantial).
108 Id. § 1115.4.
109 Id.
110 See Substantial Product Hazard Reports, 71 Fed. Reg. at 42029 (“The
Commission’s intent in adopting this provision is to give further guidance to
firms about reporting defects in their products.”).
111 See 16 C.F.R. § 1115.12(g)(1)(iii) (2018) (The Commission “[w]ill consider
the ... reasonably foreseeable use or misuse of the product, and the population
group exposed to the product” when determining if the risk to the consumer
is substantial.).
112 See id. § 1115.1 (1978).
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remains broad.113 If CPSC’s reporting rule has not been narrowed,
there is no basis for assuming that its recall authority has been
narrowed either.114 In short, consumer misuse remains as strong
a basis for CPSC recalls as it does for safety standards.115
IV. PRODUCT MISUSE AND HAZARD WARNINGS
If one were to let manufacturers define what constitutes
consumer misuse of their products, it would be easy to identify
misuse. One would simply look to the instructions regarding proper
use and any deviation from these instructions would be misuse.
Fortunately, agencies and the courts have consistently rejected
this approach because it would encourage manufacturers to unreasonably limit appropriate consumer uses of their products.116
As one court put it: “a product is not ‘misused’ merely because
the manufacturer intended that it be used in a different manner;
the manufacturer must show that the use which caused the injury was not reasonably foreseeable.”117 In short, in the product
safety context, a manufacturer may not avoid responsibility for
making its defective products safe merely because it classifies perfectly predictable and completely human behavior as misuse and
then warns against it.118 Interestingly, even in the product liability context, a number of courts have held that liability for
The Commission’s guidance to the public—repeated time and again—is
when in doubt, report. See, e.g., id. § 1115.4 (“[F]irms are urged to report if in
doubt as to whether a defect could present a substantial product hazard.”).
114 Manufacturer reporting is a prerequisite to the CPSC exerting its recall
authority. See generally id. § 1115.2.
115 See id. § 1115.12(g)(1)(ii). For example, the CPSC has distinctly recognized that the number of products remaining with consumers is a relevant
consideration, because a few defective products with little to no likelihood of
causing an injury (even in a minor way) will not typically meet the threshold
required for a substantial product hazard determination.
116 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 600.2945 (LexisNexis 2018) (“Misuse
means ... uses other than those for which the product would be considered suitable by a reasonably prudent person in the same or similar circumstances”);
Magic Chef, Inc. v. Sibley, 546 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (holding
that deviation from manufacturer-intended use is not necessarily misuse). See
generally supra notes 61–70 and accompanying text.
117 Magic Chef, 546 S.W.2d at 856.
118 See id.
113
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defective designs cannot be offset by warnings—including those
determined to be accurate, clear, and unambiguous.119
There is an equally compelling reason for caution in delegating too much authority to manufacturers to use warnings and
instructions to decide what constitutes product misuse.120 Study
after study has confirmed that consumers often do not read and
heed warnings.121 The reasons for this are many and complex, ranging from poorly crafted and placed warnings to consumer resistance to lengthy and unreadable instructions.122 For example:
x

Many consumers fail to read instruction manuals
of products they believe to be safe or familiar.123

See, e.g., Pinchinat v. Graco, 390 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1147, 1150 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (Court granted summary judgment on failure to warn claim where
warnings were “accurate, clear and unambiguous” but remanded for further
proceedings on defective design claim); Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez,
977 S.W.2d 328, 336 (Tex. 1998) (“[W]hen a safer design can reasonably be
implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption
of the safer design is required over a warning that leaves a significant residuum of such risks.”); see also Uloth v. Cty. Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192
(Mass. 1978) (“An adequate warning may reduce the likelihood of injury to the
user of a product in some cases. We decline, however, to adopt any rule which
permits a manufacturer or designer to discharge its total responsibility to workers
by simply warning of the dangers of a product.”).
120 See Eli P. Cox et al., Do Product Warnings Increase Safe Behavior? A
Meta-Analysis, 16 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 195, 195 (1997).
121 See id. (citing a review of approximately 400 published articles that
concluded “no scientific evidence was found to support the contention that onproduct warning labels measurably increase the safety of any product .... ”).
122 See, e.g., Susan G. Hadden, Regulating Product Risks Through Consumer
Information, 47 J. SOC. ISSUES 93, 98 (1991) (discussing problems of highly
technical and complex warning language); Brad Mehlenbacher et al., On the Reading of Product Owner’s Manuals: Perceptions and Product Complexity, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY, 46TH ANNUAL
MEETING 730, 730 (2002), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/15419
3120204600610 [https://perma.cc/UG5H-RSRK]) (discussing the negative impacts
of important warning information being placed in owner’s manuals).
123 See Jennifer J. Argo & Kelley J. Main, Meta-Analyses of the Effectiveness of Warning Labels, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MKTG. 193, 195 (2004) (analyzing
the effectiveness of warning labels); J. Paul Frantz et al., Potential Problems
Associated With Overusing Warnings, PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUMAN FACTORS
AND ERGONOMICS SOCIETY, 43RD ANNUAL MEETING 916 (1999) (looking at the
use of warnings, particularly the overuse and the negative consequences to
including them on products); S. Godfrey et al., Warning Messages: Will the
119
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Although consumers claim to like safety training
videos, few watch them.124
Manufacturers too often place warnings in instruction manuals rather than on the products
themselves, resulting in safety warnings not being read.125
Manufacturers too often write warnings or instructions in language that is so complex that
many consumers simply do not understand
them.126 Regrettably, some risks can be explained
only with words that are technical, long, or not
in common use.127
Merely because a consumer reads and understands a warning does not mean that the consumer will necessarily heed the warning.128

consumer bother to look?, in HUMAN FACTORS PERSPECTIVES ON WARNINGS
53, 55 (1994) (providing studies on how consumers perceive household products and what factors cause them to look for warning labels). Hadden, supra
note 122, at 97 (discussing the benefits of information provision for consumer
protection, but also the downfalls and assumptions it relies on); David W. Stewart
& Ingrid M. Martin, Intended and Unintended Consequences of Warning Messages:
A Review and Synthesis of Empirical Research, 13 J. OF PUB. POL’Y & MKTG.
1, 6 (1994) (noting that even when consumers are less familiar with a product, they are more likely to focus on information about product attributes and
uses than warning information); Michael S. Wogalter et al., Consumer Product Warnings: The Role of Hazard Perception, 22 J. SAFETY RES. 71, 72 (1991)
(researching how a consumer’s perceived danger of a product relates to the
willingness to read warning labels).
124 See Mehlenbacher et al., supra note 122, at 733.
125 See Argo & Main, supra note 123, at 195; Latin, supra note 22, at 1208–09;
Mehlenbacher et al., supra note 122, at 733; Elizabeth Tebeaux, Safety Warnings in Tractor Operation Manuals, 1920–1980: Manuals and Warnings Don’t
Always Work, 40 J. TECH. WRITING & COMM. 3, 23 (2010) (discussing consequences, specifically the common fatalities resulting from tractor operators’
failure to read safety warnings).
126 See Hadden, supra note 122, at 98.
127 See id.; David R. Lenorovitz et al., Mitigating Product Hazards via User
Warnings Alone: When/Why ‘Warnings-Only’ Approaches Are Likely to Fail, 24
HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS MFG. & SERV. INDUS. 275, 295 (2012) (criticizing
the sole use of inadequate product warnings on vehicles with known hazards).
128 See, e.g., Christopher M. Heaps & Tracy B. Henley, Language Matters:
Wording Considerations in Hazard perception and Warning Comprehension,
133 J. PSYCHOL. 341, 350 (May 1999) (testing the efficacy of warning labels
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x
x
x

Manufacturers too often place a multitude of
warnings on products that overwhelm consumer
attention.129
Two groups—the poor and elderly—often require
carefully crafted warnings that may be difficult
to develop.130
In a “Catch-22”-type syndrome, consumers will
read warnings if they know that a product is potentially dangerous, but they may not know that
a product is dangerous unless they read the
warnings.131

These and other caveats about the efficacy of warnings and
instructions remind us that those who rely on them as a safety
strategy often do so cynically, seeking to avoid liability despite
knowing that warnings alone do little to protect consumers from
unreasonable harm. They also realize that other approaches, such
as product redesign, are almost always more effective. In fact,
the public health community has long promoted a safety hierarchy that prioritizes its approaches to product hazards as follows:
x
x
x

Product redesign to eliminate the hazard.132
Shielding to place the hazard safely away from
the consumer.133
Last resort: warnings if redesign and shielding
are not feasible. 134

on household cleaners); Stewart & Martin, supra note 123, at 10–13; A.G.
Vredenburgh & J. Helmick-Rich, Extrinsic Nonwarning Factors, in HANDBOOK
OF WARNINGS 373, 380 (Michael S. Wogalter ed., 2006).
129 See Frantz et al., supra note 123, at 917.
130 See Argo & Main, supra note 123, at 195; Hadden, supra note 122, at 93.
131 See Hadden, supra note 122, at 97.
132 See Marc Green, Safety Hierarchy: Design versus Warnings (2000),
http://www.visualexpert.com/Resources/safetyhierarchy.html [https://perma.cc
/CU7X-F32L].
133 See id.
134 See id.; see also Lenorovitz et al., supra note 127, at 277; Michael S.
Wogalter & Kenneth R. Laughery, WARNING! Sign and Label Effectiveness,
5 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 33, 36 (1996).
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V. INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON PRODUCT MISUSE
Although our focus has been on the United States, we feel
it useful to broaden the discussion at this point to demonstrate the
similarity of treatment of product misuse issues by the international community. We turn therefore to policy pronouncements
from ISO, the International Organization for Standardization, an
independent, non-governmental body of standards bodies headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland.135 ISO is the world’s largest
developer of voluntary standards, having produced over twenty
thousand standards covering everything from manufactured products to food safety, agriculture, and health care.136
In 2014, ISO issued a set of Safety Guidelines for ISO
standards.137 What is particularly compelling about ISO’s guidelines is their insistence that safety standards address reasonably foreseeable misuse. The Guidelines do this by describing how
producers and others should achieve what the Guidelines describe
as “tolerable risk.”138 Below is an excerpt from the Guidelines’
description of the necessary considerations in achieving tolerable risk.
6.2 Tolerable Risk
6.2.1 All products and systems include hazards and, therefore,
some level of residual risk. However, the risk should be reduced
to a tolerable level ....
6.2.3 Drafters of standards shall consider safety aspects for the
intended use and the reasonably foreseeable misuse of products
and systems, and apply risk reduction measures to achieve a
tolerable risk level.
6.2.4 Drafters of standards shall also consider reasonably foreseeable uses of the product which, even if they are not intended
uses are readily predictable based on the collective experience
of the end user population. In particular, when determining
See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, https://www.iso.org
/about-us.html [http://perma.cc/3MNZ-GERP]. ISO was founded in 1926 as the
International Federation of National Standardizing Associations. After World War
II, in a coordinated move with the United Nations, it was reinstituted as ISO. Id.
136 Id.
137 See ISO Safety Guidelines, supra note 19.
138 Id. at 2 (defining tolerable risk as the “level of risk that is accepted in a
given context based on the current values of society”).
135
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the risk posed by consumer products, consideration should be
given for products that are intended for, or are used by, vulnerable consumers139 who are often unable to understand the
hazard or the associated risk.
6.2.5 To many suppliers, it might seem that the end user does
not use the product for its intended purpose or in the manner
intended. However, predictable, known human behavior should
be considered in the design process. 140

In short, despite the laments of some naysayers that product
misuse ought not be the concern of producers, standards writers,
or the government, we believe that an overwhelming international
consensus exists that enlightened policymakers need to protect
end users from harm arising from foreseeable product misuse.
CONCLUSION
There have been too many instances in which consumers,
especially parents, have come before CPSC to urge the agency to
take regulatory action against hazardous products that have
harmed their families even though a finger of blame might be
pointed at them for their carelessness or negligence.141 A number of these individuals have confessed that they previously had
139 ISO’s Guidelines define a “vulnerable consumer” as one who is “at greater
risk of harm from products or systems due to age, level of literacy, physical or
mental condition of limitations, or inability to access product safety information.” Id.
140 Id. at 5–6.
141 See, e.g., Complaint at 6, In re Britax Child Safety Inc., Docket No. 18-1
(Consumer Product Safety Commission 2018), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3fs-pub
lic/pdfs/recall/lawsuits/abc/2018-02-16-Complaint-In-re-Britax-Child-Safety-Inc
.pdf?mQufi7GrG7MFQLoRkVvn8oH8e5cyCsDe [http://perma.cc/7M48-5HER]
(describing injuries to children as part of initial filing in CPSC adjudicative
proceeding against stroller manufacturer); In re Maxfield & Oberton Holdings, LLC, Compl. at 5–6, CPSC Docket 12-1 (2012), https://www.cpsc.gov/s3
fs-public/pdfs/lawsuit_maxfield1a.pdf [http://perma.cc/QW3G-PKZE] (describing injuries to children as part of initial filing in CPSC adjudicative proceeding
against magnet toy manufacturer); Report #20180816-49B63-2147386132,
SAFERPRODUCTS.GOV (2018), https://www.saferproducts.gov/ViewIncident/178
4824 [http://perma.cc/N4WP-T5QW] (report from parent whose child was injured by a malfunctioning stroller); Report #20120906-5E592-1270611, SAFER
PRODUCTS.GOV (2012), https://www.saferproducts.gov/ViewIncident/1270611
[http://perma.cc/VU9G-AKND] (report from parent whose child was injured
by a malfunctioning crib).
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been dismissive of what they referred to as “those stupid consumers.”142 Yet, when tragedy hits, they suddenly see the wisdom
of protecting even those who did not precisely follow the manufacturer’s instructions or whose attention momentarily strayed—
especially when removing the hazard by redesigning the product
would be extremely cost-effective.
To pick one poignant example, in 1992, the Commission
was petitioned to regulate baby walkers, the cause of numerous
serious injuries and deaths that occurred when infants tumbled
downstairs while using baby walkers.143 At that time, one Commissioner condemned her colleagues for voting to undertake
rulemaking, arguing that irresponsible caregivers, not defective
walkers, constituted the hazard.144 Accordingly, she insisted that
the only fix should be educating parents about the need to install
gates at the top of stairs: “Babies who fall down stairs—in and
out of walkers—are victims of the same hazard—unprotected stairs.
THE SIMPLE ACT OF CLOSING A DOOR OR INSTALLING
AND USING A GATE COULD ELIMINATE OVER 40,000 ACCIDENTS PER YEAR. Baby walkers do not present a mechanical
hazard.”145
To us, the irresponsible party was the dissenting Commissioner, who was prepared to consign tens of thousands of innocent
children to broken bones, shattered skulls, or even death simply
because she felt that caregivers did not live up to her notion of
responsible behavior. What makes her position so frustrating and
unacceptable is that once the Commission turned its attention to
See Elaine Walster, Assignment of Responsibility for an Accident, 3 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 73, 77 (1966) (presenting the classic study showing that the worse the consequences of an accidental occurrence, the greater
the tendency of others to assign responsibility to the accident victim and explicating the defensive attribution theory). See also Neal Feigenson et al., Effect of
Blameworthiness and Outcome Severity on Attributions of Responsibility and
Damage Awards in Comparative Negligence Cases, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
597, 612 (1997) (noting that bystanders not only blame the victim, but often try
to distance themselves from the victim in effort to preserve their belief that
they will not find themselves in a similar situation).
143 Baby Walkers; Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; Request for
Comments and Information, 59 Fed. Reg. 39306, 39307 (Aug. 2, 1994).
144 See Statement of Commissioner Mary Sheila Gall on Proposed Government Regulation of Baby Walkers (June 30, 1994).
145 Id.
142
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the problem, manufacturers quickly developed a simple yet elegant
solution: attaching plastic “skids” on the bottom of the walkers’
frames that acted as a brake when a wheel went off a step.146
This inexpensive fix prevented the walker from tumbling down
the stairs, virtually eliminating the hazard.147
We have seen numerous other situations in which objections have been raised to effective safety solutions, simply because consumers acted in perfectly human and predictable ways
that could be classified as careless, even though safety solutions
existed that were nonintrusive and inexpensive.148 The typical
response is to offer warnings to consumers and then criticize and
abandon them when they (predictably) do not follow the warnings—an approach we refer to as “warn and scorn.”149
We hope for and expect a more humane response from
policymakers at health and safety agencies. Blaming consumers
who used a product and were injured or killed as a result, simply
because their reasonably foreseeable use was somehow at odds with
the use intended by the producer or designer, is not just inhumane and reprehensible. It is truly bad public policy particularly
when it is the basis to justify regulatory inaction. Using foreseeable consumer behavior—victim blaming—to undercut regulatory
goals is unacceptable. It deviates from the clear congressional
mandate at CPSC and turns fundamental notions of accountability upside down.150 A legal culture that scapegoats consumers
is little more than a grotesque symptom of pathological regulatory
See, e.g., Chicco Walky-Talky Baby Walker, AMAZON, https://www.amazon
.com/Chicco-Walky-Talky-Walker-Flora/dp/B01LPQ41HU/ref=sr_1_fkmr0_1_a
_it?ie=UTF8&qid=1538331975&sr=8-1-fkmr0&keywords=Chicca%2BWalky
%2BTalky%2BBaby%2BWalker%2C%2BFlora&th=1 [http://perma.cc/U4N5
-H4EB] (example of baby walker with brakes).
147 See id.
148 See, e.g., 147 CONG. REC. S8452 (daily ed. July 31, 2001) (statement of Sen.
Biden) (describing an instance of Commissioner Gall opposing simple fire safety
solutions).
149 There is a better way. Scholars such as William Askren, an industrial
psychologist, have developed extremely helpful tools for assessing and minimizing risks arising from the reasonably foreseeable misuse of products. See William
B. Askren, Predicting and Evaluating Misuses of Products, 13 ERGONOMICS IN
DESIGN 15, 16–18 (2005), http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1064
80460501300105?journalCode=erga [http://perma.cc/CW6S-V7ZK].
150 See supra notes 19–22 and accompanying text.
146

2019]

MISUSE OF PRODUCT MISUSE

367

capture.151 It undermines the deterrent effect of both product
safety regulation at CPSC and the broader deterrent effect of
tort liability in the civil justice system.152 Seen in that light, a
ramped up consumer misuse standard rewards those who create
risks and punishes those who are harmed.153 That cannot possibly be the legacy anticipated when CPSC was formed nearly a
half-century ago.154

See generally Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The
FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495 (2005) (assessing the means by which business interests effectively insinuate their perspectives on regulatory action);
Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA
L. REV. 1 (1997); Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013).
152 See supra notes 19–21 and accompanying text; supra note 25 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text.
154 The agency was created and first went into operation in 1972. Who We
Are—What We Do For You, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM’N, https://www.cpsc
.gov/Safety-Education/Safety-Guides/General-Information/Who-We-Are---What
-We-Do-for-You [http://perma.cc/7M6X-LJPB].
151

